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Theories of nonproﬁt organizations have generally centered on the moti-
vations of not-for-proﬁt entrepreneurs.1 Regardless of the motivations of
the nonproﬁt’s founder, however, a key connecting idea among these theo-
ries is the assumption of the nondistribution constraint as the deﬁning
characteristic of the nonproﬁt form (Hansmann 1996). In this paper, we
take this deﬁnition of nonproﬁts as a point of departure, and discuss the
implications for the ﬁnancial structure and governance of nonproﬁt or-
ganizations, regardless of their underlying motivations. In a for-proﬁt or-
ganization, shareholders act as the residual bearers of risk. Because non-
proﬁts, by deﬁnition, have no residual claimants, there must be some other
means of absorbing shocks that exist in a world of uncertain donations and
uncertain needs for program expenditures. One possibility would be
simply to allow for shocks to revenue streams to be passed on to program
expenditures, thus eﬀectively making the recipients of an organization’s
services bear the burden. However, a desire for “production smoothing”
naturally leads to a search for an alternative buﬀer. Thus nonproﬁt organ-
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1. More precisely, most theories of nonproﬁts are based on one of two ideas: (a) a desire to
provide a product at the low marginal cost of production, perhaps due to externalities created
by the good (see, e.g., Weisbrod 1988), or (b) an interest in signaling the production of a high-
quality good where quality is diﬃcult to observe or verify (e.g., Hansmann 1996; Glaeser and
Shleifer 2000).izations will hold precautionary savings in the form of endowment fund
balances, to protect against adverse revenue shocks.
In this paper, we take a preliminary step in analyzing empirically the role
of the endowment in nonproﬁt organizations. We begin by describing,
across industries, the endowment characteristics of nonproﬁt organiza-
tions. We further provide some preliminary regression results on endow-
ment intensity that are suggestive of a precautionary saving motive for en-
dowments. This need to maintain a fund balance to smooth the provision
of services potentially leads to problems of governance and managerial
discretion. This observation is obviously related to familiar themes in cor-
porate ﬁnance, which has often focused on the agency problems created by
giving managers access to discretionary funds in for-proﬁt organizations
(e.g., Jensen 1986). The problem is that, given the opportunity, for-proﬁt
managers will “steal” from the ﬁrm, by consuming perquisites in one form
or another. A similar question arises for donors to nonproﬁt organizations.
On the one hand, there is a need for a fund balance to smooth consump-
tion. On the other hand, managers may take advantage of these funds to
pursue pet projects or even pay themselves higher salaries. Two possible so-
lutions exist: Donors may insist that funds be spent right away, thereby en-
suring that their donations are put to good use at the expense of the pro-
duction-smoothing ability of the organization.2 Alternatively, donors may
rely on monitoring technologies that guarantee that all funds, both present
and future, are spent appropriately. We describe some of the modes of
oversight and monitoring that might be used to curb malfeasance, and sug-
gest some empirical implications of our framework for future work.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 7.1, we describe
the process of endowment generation and donor behavior that we believe
governs nonproﬁt organizations. Section 7.2 provides a discussion on po-
tential measures of governance in nonproﬁts. In section 7.3, we provide de-
tails on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data that we use to examine or-
ganizations’ endowments. Our results on patterns of endowments and
precautionary savings are presented in section 7.4. In section 7.5, we un-
dertake a preliminary investigation in the link between governance and en-
dowment intensity; section 7.6 concludes.
7.1 Donations and Endowments in Nonproﬁt Organizations
Consider ﬁrst the problem faced by a not-for-proﬁt entrepreneur who
derives utility from providing a good for which the equilibrium market
price will not cover average cost. This entrepreneur must therefore raise
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2. Note that this more commonly takes the form of donations of products (e.g., medicine
to aid organizations, or books to a library) rather than cash donations that must be spent im-
mediately. From a saving perspective, the eﬀect is the same.donations from like-minded donors, who similarly obtain utility from the
provision of this good. By assumption, consumers and donors of the non-
proﬁt’s output are not identical.3 Donors are therefore required to provide
funds to the entrepreneur, with the assumption that he or she will use them
to further the stated mission of the organization (i.e., by producing the
good that the organization was established to provide).
Within this model, we introduce the following complication: Very often,
an organization is faced with uncertain circumstances with regard to rev-
enue and cost streams. This may be driven by uncertainty over future de-
mand for the organization’s services, future donations, or changes in input
prices. For example, consider the circumstances of the Riverside Church
Soup Kitchen, whose mission is to feed the homeless of upper Manhattan,
following the stock market decline of 2000–2001. This simultaneously in-
creased the demand for its services and reduced the capacity of its donor
base to provide funding. Assuming that this is a temporary shock, the or-
ganization may be forced to cut back services exactly when the need is
greatest. An alternative is for the entrepreneur to hold funds in reserve, as
precautionary savings, for situations where the organization faces a short-
fall. This is what is commonly referred to as an endowment, or fund bal-
ance. This may be used as a buﬀer in circumstances where there exists a gap
between what donors provide and what is required for program services.
Endowments are often described in these terms, as a fund to protect the or-
ganization from “rainy days.”
However, as noted in the introduction, providing managers with this pre-
cautionary savings device may allow them to “steal” from the organiza-
tion, by pursuing interests that diverge from those of the donors, by con-
suming perquisites, or even potentially by taking inappropriate ﬁnancial
compensation. Having recognized this danger, donors and society more
broadly may wish to impose conditions that restrain nonproﬁt manage-
ment from taking inappropriate actions. This may include monitoring by
the government or by donors; we consider some of the mechanisms in use
in the following section, in some greater detail. Furthermore, if donors
know that they will be expropriated by providing endowments to entrepre-
neurs they may choose to limit the discretionary funds available to man-
agers in the ﬁrst place.
Now, the preceding story is premised on two basic assumptions: (a) that
it is easier for managers to pursue personal interests with endowment
funds rather than with streams of revenue, and (b) that donors have some
incentive to provide managers with endowments, rather than simply pro-
viding funding on an annual basis. We now provide some evidence in sup-
port of these assumptions.
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3. See preceding references, such as Hansmann (1996) and Glaeser and Shleifer (2000), for
reasons that this might be the case.7.1.1 Expropriation of the Endowment
Application of our argument to endowment expropriation closely fol-
lows agency models, which emphasizes that providing managers with dis-
cretionary funds may lead to governance problems. In such a setting
Jensen (1986) argues, for example, that an organization should hold a high
level of debt, so that all cash inﬂows must be used to service this debt and
stave oﬀ the bankruptcy that would cause the manager to lose his or her
job. Analogously, in a nonproﬁt ﬁrm, if the organization has very little
cushion in the form of an endowment, all cash inﬂows will be required to
meet the organization’s basic mission requirements, leaving relatively little
scope for expropriation. Furthermore, to the extent that the organization
faces binding constraints and that donations are made for particular pur-
poses,4 expropriation may be diﬃcult.
The popular press is littered with examples that illustrate this distinc-
tion between endowment and revenue expropriation. For example, in a
particularly high-proﬁle case in 2000, three former oﬃcials of Alleghany
Health Education were arrested and charged with diverting $52 million in
charitable endowments, for “inappropriate and personal uses.” The case
of the Bishop Estate, a charitable trust created in 1884 by one of the last
members of Hawaii’s royal family, provides a particularly compelling il-
lustration of these ideas. The Bishop Estate held an endowment, worth
$10 billion in 1997, proved to be too much of a temptation for the estate’s
ﬁve trustees. Funds were diverted for purposes that furthered the ﬁnan-
cial interests of the stewards of the endowment, through such mecha-
nisms as political donations and direct investment in trustee-owned com-
panies.
7.1.2 Endowment Expropriation and Donors
Given this potential for expropriation, the question arises of why donors
ever allow for endowments in the ﬁrst place, rather than simply promising
to make up for shortfalls in the future. One answer draws once again on an
analogy from research in corporate ﬁnance. One of the diﬃculties with
Jensen’s arguments for constraining managers is that management may
have preferential information on the nature of investment opportunities,
so it will be useful to provide them with some discretionary resources. Sim-
ilarly, nonproﬁt managers may have a better sense of the needs of their or-
ganizations, so it may be beneﬁcial for them to have some discretionary
funds available when needs arise. It may be costly for management to have
to petition donors for additional funds whenever there are unexpected
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4. For example, in a case related to one of the authors, a donor told of donating storm win-
dows to his daughter’s private school because he was sure that this would not be a fungible do-
nation.needs. More generally, the transactions costs associated with the “meeting
the shortfall” could be substantial.
Another possibility comes from a closer consideration of what exactly
the nonproﬁt is “selling” to its donors. Casual observation suggests that
much donation revenue is motivated by a desire for fame in perpetuity. This
factor could lead to endowments for two reasons: Nonproﬁt managers
may thus be better positioned to extract endowment funds from donors,
through techniques such as “naming rights”; and the willingness of others
to give to a nonproﬁt may increase with the endowment of the nonproﬁt,
which guarantees its permanence. Hence, any individual donor can get
other donors to commit more if the ﬁrst donor commits his or her own
money, not only for current expenses but for future expenses as well. In ei-
ther case, a discretionary fund results for the manager, which may allow for
the aforementioned expropriation to occur. We then must consider what
steps may be taken to limit the extent of this expropriation.
7.2 Modes of Governance
There are a number of potential watchdogs that could mitigate the en-
dowment-expropriation potential described in the preceding section. We
consider here three possibilities: government oversight, media oversight,
and donor oversight.
7.2.1 Government Oversight
Society, broadly deﬁned, may choose to monitor nonproﬁts to prevent
expropriation. Just as the Securities and Exchange Commission was estab-
lished to prevent the expropriation of investors in for-proﬁt ﬁrms, several
governmental organizations exist to mitigate expropriation in nonproﬁts.
Both federal and state-level bodies exist to oversee nonproﬁts. These bod-
ies essentially enforce laws that are meant to ensure that the organization’s
resources are used to pursue the organization’s stated mission, and to pre-
vent the expropriation of value by insiders.5 For example, the IRS regula-
tions passed in 1998 provide speciﬁc guidance to charitable organizations
on what constitutes appropriate ﬁnancial compensation of executives, and
further provides for penalties if these regulations are not followed.
Primary responsibility for the legal oversight of nonproﬁts, however, de-
volves to the level of the state.6 While IRS oversight may be uniform across
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5. More details on regulations from Minnesota may be downloaded from the website of the
Minnesota Attorney General: http://www.ag.state.mn.us/charities/Default.htm. The website also
contains links to the sites of other attorneys general. Internal Revenue Service regulations may
be downloaded from http://www.irs.gov/exempt/display/0,,i1%3D3%26genericId%3D15048,00.
html.
6. Most legal actions are initiated by state attorney general oﬃces (private communication,
Marion Fremont-Smith, Harvard University).the country, there exist vast diﬀerences across the states in the extent of
local oversight. The Oﬃce of the Ohio Attorney General carefully docu-
mented these diﬀerences in a report in 1974. As the authors of the report
emphasize, there remain dramatic diﬀerences in the resources allocated to
oversight of nonproﬁts, as well as the scope for actions against nonproﬁts
by the state attorneys general.7 The report emphasized eight possible pow-
ers, spelled out in appendix A of this paper; each state’s score is listed in ap-
pendix B. These ﬁgures are based on the regulation of nonproﬁts in 1974,
which is the most recent information available. There have been almost no
changes since then in state-level nonproﬁt statutes (personal communica-
tion, Marion Fremont-Smith, Harvard University).
There is considerable variation in the extent of state-level oversight, and
this variation does not seem to be easily explained by income, or by simple
geographic proximity. We consider below how some measures of gover-
nance vary across states with diﬀerent levels of oversight.
7.2.2 Media Oversight
While the state attorney general are the primary enforcing bodies for
nonproﬁts, very often cases come to light because of the activities of the
media. This may be in the form of traditional investigative reporting; for
example, the Bishop Estate case described above was originally brought to
light through the work of a journalist. Furthermore, the media may play a
disciplinary role in managerial discretion that is inappropriate, although
not strictly illegal.
This element to oversight has increased in visibility recently, as several
watchdog organizations have taken advantage of the Internet to dissemi-
nate information about the quality of nonproﬁt governance. The most
prominent among these include the Better Business Bureau and Guidestar.
Generally, these organizations provide basic accounting information on
charitable organizations, and also attempt to evaluate their governance
structures. This includes information on program spending (relative to
fund-raising) ratios, executive compensation, and the structure of the
board, which may also be relevant for the extent of expropriation.
We have not yet compiled data that might be used to examine the media
as a source of oversight. Numerous possibilities exist, however, including
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7. One may be concerned that nonproﬁt regulation is of limited relevance, unless states de-
vote signiﬁcant resources to enforcing these regulations. In the same report cited above, the
Oﬃce of the Ohio Attorney General also collected data on the human resources devoted to
the enforcement of nonproﬁt regulation. The number of full-time employees devoted to en-
forcement, deﬂated by state population, is highly correlated with the extent of regulation, as
measured in our study. Moreover, when we use this as a measure of governance, it yields sim-
ilar (although slightly weaker) results to our law-based deﬁnition. Alternatively, examining
actual convictions for misconduct is unlikely to be revealing, because eﬀective enforcement
will increase the proportion of illegal acts that are uncovered but will reduce the number of
such acts that are committed.media penetration, by city or state; coverage by media watchdogs; and rat-
ings from these watchdog organizations.
7.2.3 Board and Donor Oversight
Underlying much of the discussion on donor oversight is the role of the
board of directors, who are owners of the organization in the sense that
they are given ultimate decision-making rights over the organization’s as-
sets. Thus, just as the board of a for-proﬁt organization acts on behalf of
shareholders, nonproﬁt boards may act on behalf of donors. Furthermore,
just as large shareholders may demand representation on for-proﬁt boards,
large donors may demand representation on nonproﬁt boards.
The analogy between for-proﬁt and nonproﬁt boards further allows us
to develop some hypotheses as to the characteristics that may promote
good governance. These include representation of large donors on the
board (“shareholder representation”); the presence of large donors that
may be expected to monitor on behalf of the broader donor community,
thereby overcoming the free-rider problem in monitoring (“ownership
concentration”); outside representation on the board; noncompensation
of board members; and so on. Many of the latter examples are spelled out
in the governance guidelines for boards given by the Better Business Bu-
reau. We therefore expect to be able to collect information on these di-
mensions of governance in the future. At this point, we can only loosely say
that there appears to be considerable variation among organizations in the
choice of governance structures.
Examining the various dimensions of oversight and governance de-
scribed above is an important avenue for research. For example, do vary-
ing degrees of state oversight lead to diﬀerent levels of monitoring by other
bodies—that is, are boards more active in the absence of strong govern-
ment pressure? Alternatively, one could easily imagine that diﬀerent over-
sight mechanisms act as complements (e.g., the media is eﬀective in bring-
ing about change only if accompanied by strong legal enforcement).
7.3 Data
For this paper, we concentrate on charitable nonproﬁt organizations (so-
called 501[c][3] organizations, named for the section of the U.S. federal in-
come tax code that gives them tax-exempt status), making use of the IRS
Statistics of Income ﬁles. This is a data set compiled by the National Cen-
ter for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) at the Urban Institute and derived
from data taken from the Form 990 that tax-exempt organizations must ﬁle
with the IRS. These data contain all 501(c)(3) organizations with more
than $10 million in assets, plus a random sample of approximately 4,000
smaller organizations. Most ﬁnancial variables on the Form 990 are
included, and the data are considered to be more reliable than the data in
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NCCS.8
Our measure of the endowment, or net assets, is from the Form 990; this
is simply total assets less total liabilities (ENDOWMENT).9 Research on
nonproﬁt organizations generally uses the term “endowment” to refer to a
restricted fund for which, at least in theory, the principal cannot be spent.
They are therefore careful to make a distinction between restricted (en-
dowment) and unrestricted (fund balance) funds. We do not believe that
such a distinction is necessary here: Restricted (endowment) funds are held
primarily by large educational institutions and hospitals. These organiza-
tions are generally able to borrow against the value of their endowments,
and may furthermore use the interest generated by the endowments to
make interest payments on their loans. Particularly given that these organ-
izations are generally able to issue tax-exempt bonds, it would appear that
the restriction on endowment payout is not binding.
We require some means of scaling endowment size; we deﬂate by annual
total expenses (EXPENSES), which lends itself to a natural interpretation:
ENDOWMENT/EXPENSES reﬂects the number of years that the organ-
ization may continue to operate at its current scale, ﬁnance solely by the en-
dowment.
In examining the determinants of endowment size, we require variables
that are related to an organization’s ability to cope with ﬁnancial shocks,
other than using the endowment as a buﬀer. We focus on labor intensity
and access to alternative ﬁnancing. We measure labor intensity by the ra-
tio of total wages to total expenses (LABIN).10 To proxy for access to ﬁ-
nancing, we use a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the organi-
zation obtained a loan during the decade 1987–1996 (DEBT). Obviously,
there is an oﬀsetting eﬀect here: Organizations with large endowments may
borrow against their endowments, thereby generating a positive relation-
ship between DEBT and endowment intensity. Hence, in this case, there is
a bias against ﬁnding a negative relation.
The Statistics of Income ﬁles contain annual observations on 10,000 to
12,000 organizations per year, varying by year, for 1987–1996, with ap-
proximately 18,000 organizations ﬁling in at least one year. Prior to 1987,
the data were collected on a much smaller sample of organizations. We
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8. For more details, see the NCCS Web site at http://nccs.urban.org/index.htm.
9. An alternative, and perhaps more direct, measure of the endowment is the organization’s
holdings that could potentially be used to ﬁnance program expenditure. More precisely, we
may use the following equation: ENDOWMENT   CASH    BANK DEPOSITS  
SECURITIES   REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT. This measure is very highly correlated
with reported fund balance (  0.96), and using it as an alternative yields virtually identical
results (available from the authors).
10. An alternative measure of labor intensity would be to deﬂate by physical capital. How-
ever, because physical capital is a signiﬁcant part of the endowment, it would be almost tau-
tological to have such a variable on the right-hand side of the regression.limit our analyses to the approximately 5,300 organizations that ﬁled with
the IRS every year during this period. After removing mutual organiza-
tions (dominated by TIAA-CREF), grant-making foundations and trusts,
and organizations whose industry is “unknown,” the sample is reduced to
5,007 organizations. We also limit the sample to organizations that consis-
tently report sensible values for the variables that are central to our analy-
ses. We remove organizations with negative reported revenues or expenses,
a 1987 endowment rate of greater than 100, and a negative ratio of private
donations to revenues. These omissions result in a further reduction of 461
ﬁrms, leaving a total of 4,546 organizations.
Table 7.1 presents summary statistics for the entire sample, while table
7.2 presents the distribution of median values by industry for a subset of
variables. As table 7.2 makes clear, the sample is dominated by health care
organizations, which are primarily hospitals. Because hospitals tend to be
larger than other nonproﬁts, health care is even more dominant in the rev-
enue-weighted distribution of organizations (see column [1]). However, the
representation of hospitals does not increase, relative to the simple head-
count measure, when organizations are weighted by their endowments (see
column [2]); rather, the endowment weighting shifts the focus to educa-
tional institutions. This is a reﬂection of educational institutions’ large or-
ganizational size as well as their relative endowment intensiveness.
7.4 Endowment Intensity and Precautionary Savings
In the estimates presented in table 7.3 and 7.4, we move from examining
the distribution of organizations across industries to looking at organiza-
tional characteristics, by industry. We begin by looking at the variable of
primary interest: endowment intensity (Endowment/Expenses). Not sur-
prisingly, given the results from table 7.2, endowment intensity is by far the
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Table 7.1 Summary Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
ENDOWMENT ($1,000) 39,736.24 159,664.90 0 5,207,517
Endowment/Expenses 3.17 6.75 0 98.62
Log(Endowment/Expenses) 1.00 0.77 0 4.60
Expenses ($1,000) 33,436.97 101,734.80 9.671 4,039,460
Revenues ($1,000) 36,431.88 108,203.10 6.608 4,108,413
Private donations/Revenues 0.14 0.21 0 1.89
(Labor costs)/(Total expenses) 0.41 0.20 0 0.89
Loan dummy 0.67 0.47 0 1.89
Private donations ($1,000) 2,642.20 14,095.07 0 667,663
Observations 4,546
Source: Authors’ calculations.lowest among hospitals. Of the other categories, we observe a particularly
high rate of endowment intensity among arts organizations. The second
column in Table 7.3 suggests one element to this pattern: A much larger
proportion of revenues comes from donations (rather than generated in-
come) in arts organizations, relative to hospitals. However, health care ap-
pears to be systematically diﬀerent from other nonproﬁt activities; in
particular, the median donation rate is signiﬁcantly below that of other sec-
tors. In general, as numerous scholars have noted (see, e.g., Weisbrod
1998), hospitals behave increasingly like for-proﬁt organizations; accord-
ingly, we also report empirical results for nonproﬁt organization samples
including and excluding hospitals, where appropriate.
The data in table 7.2 and 7.3 are suggestive of relatively high endow-
ment-to-expense ratios in many industries; moreover, there is considerable
variation across industries. We may tentatively examine whether there may
be systematic industry diﬀerences that could possibly lead to diﬀerences in
endowment intensity, by comparing industries’ (a) potential to take on
debt, (b) ability to maintain a labor-intensive production process, and (c)
level of cash ﬂow volatility (proxied by standard deviation of revenues).
Table 7.4 reports these patterns. Again, we focus on the three largest in-
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Table 7.2 Distribution of Organizations, Weighted by Size (%)
Total Total Value of Total
Revenue Endowment Organizations
Arts 2.25 4.17 6.03
Education 26.67 49.32 29.45
Environment 0.11 0.26 0.86
Animal-related 0.21 0.38 0.81
Health 61.89 34.53 37.62
Mental health 0.31 0.23 1.36
Diseases 0.76 0.51 1.08
Medical research 0.53 3.43 0.97
Crime, legal-related 0.12 0.08 0.37
Employment, job-related 0.07 0.07 0.66
Food, agriculture, and nutrition 0.01 0.01 0.09
Housing, shelter 0.06 0.06 1.21
Public safety 0.04 0.02 0.24
Recreation/sports 0.18 0.23 0.79
Youth development 0.16 0.25 1.19
Human services 2.76 3.66 11.92
International/foreign aﬀairs 1.11 0.65 0.99
Civil rights/social action 0.04 0.03 0.15
Community improvement 0.18 0.28 1.12
Science research 1.86 1.06 1.32
Social science research 0.15 0.18 0.33
Society beneﬁt 0.27 0.29 0.48
Religious 0.26 0.28 0.92dustries: arts, education, and health care. Systematically, arts and educa-
tion organizations appear to have a greater need for endowments, relative
to health care organizations: They have less labor-intensive expense ratios,
are less likely to have taken a loan, and have more volatile revenue streams.
Table 7.5 presents results describing industry median endowment inten-
sity and the eﬀects of the three aspects of precautionary savings described
above. Each measure of endowment need enters with the expected sign;
however, when all measures are included simultaneously, the loan dummy
variable is no longer signiﬁcant.
7.5 Endowment Intensity and Governance: Preliminary Results
The extent to which an organization has precautionary savings require-
ments will depend upon its speciﬁc circumstances. However, as a rough
guide for examining the summary statistics, we take the National Center
for Nonproﬁt Boards guidelines that “not more than two years’ expenses”
should be held as an endowment. By this measure, the median organiza-
tion in many industries in our sample already exceeds the suggested level
of endowment intensity. Furthermore, the distributions within each indus-
try suggest that there are relatively fat tails in the range of endowment in-
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Table 7.3 Median Endowment Intensity and Donation Intensity, by Industry






Mental health 0.68 0.079
Diseases 0.83 0.188
Medical research 2.43 0.297
Crime, legal-related 0.66 0.284
Employment, job-related 0.82 0.037
Food, agriculture, and nutrition 2.24 0.421
Housing, shelter 0.92 0.108
Public safety 2.83 0.159
Recreation/sports 1.86 0.235
Youth development 2.01 0.264
Human services 1.38 0.149
International/foreign aﬀairs 0.83 0.380
Civil rights/social action 0.94 0.664
Community improvement 1.82 0.128
Science research 1.08 0.102
Social science research 2.32 0.277
Society beneﬁt 0.99 0.216
Religious 2.50 0.440Table 7.4 Organizational Characteristics that Aﬀect Endowment Intensity:
Medians
ReceivedL a bor 
Loan Intensity Volatility
Arts 0.38 0.40 0.24
Education 0.67 0.45 0.14
Environment 0.41 0.41 0.30
Animal-related 0.24 0.44 0.19
Health 0.81 0.48 0.15
Mental health 0.65 0.55 0.18
Diseases 0.39 0.31 0.12
Medical research 0.27 0.43 0.21
Crime, legal-related 0.18 0.39 0.17
Employment, job-related 0.53 0.59 0.19
Food, agriculture, and nutrition 0.00 0.38 0.28
Housing, shelter 0.87 0.17 0.19
Public safety 0.73 0.10 0.14
Recreation/sports 0.22 0.20 0.20
Youth development 0.37 0.48 0.21
Human services 0.64 0.51 0.15
International/foreign aﬀairs 0.36 0.25 0.23
Civil rights/social action 0.43 0.47 0.20
Community improvement 0.35 0.22 0.25
Science research 0.42 0.30 0.18
Social science research 0.27 0.36 0.19
Society beneﬁt 0.41 0.35 0.19
Religious 0.50 0.24 0.23
Table 7.5 Determinants of Endowment Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volatility 28.81 23.41
(5.54) (7.45)
Loan dummy –3.14 –0.77
(1.19) (1.48)
Labor intensity –7.73 –5.10
(2.69) (2.68)
CONSTANT –1.64 5.09 6.46 1.51
(1.00) (0.75) (1.06) (1.99)
R2 0.36 0.14 0.15 0.43
N 23 23 23 23
Notes:Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use robust standard errors. Volatility is
the standard deviation of revenues for each organization during 1987–1996. Loan dummy re-
ﬂects whether an organization received a loan during 1987–1996. Labor intensity is the ratio
of labor expenses to total expenses in 1987. In all cases, the dependent variable is the 1987 ra-
tio of endowment to total expenses.tensities. This point is illustrated in table 7.6, which lists the 10th and 90th
percentiles of endowment intensity, by industry. In particular, among both
arts and educational organizations, the top 10 percent of organizations by
endowment ratio have more than ten years’ expenses in endowment.
Our measure of the extent of oversight comes from variation in oversight
across states, as described in section 7.3 above.11 Table 7.7 presents results
relating endowment intensities by level of oversight, where “oversight” is
measured by the number of powers accorded to the state attorney general
in monitoring and punishing nonproﬁts.
Somewhat surprisingly, there are no systematic diﬀerences across states
in terms of a relationship between oversight and endowment intensity. This
ﬁnding likely reﬂects a diﬀerential composition of industries across states;
the role of substitute modes of governance in low-oversight states; donors’
reaction to poor governance by “starving” nonproﬁts so that they are un-
able to grow to have sizeable expenses (the denominator of the dependent
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Table 7.6 Endowment Intensity, 10th and 90th Percentiles






Mental health 0.11 2.56
Diseases 0.15 4.42
Medical research 0.55 13.78
Crime, legal-related 0.09 6.87
Employment, job-related 0.19 5.04
Food, agriculture, and nutrition 0.26 15.75
Housing, shelter 0.19 5.97
Public safety 0.14 18.42
Recreation/sports 0.38 10.88
Youth development 0.75 7.80
Human services 0.20 6.23
International/foreign aﬀairs 0.09 10.13
Civil rights/social action 0.58 4.38
Community improvement 0.32 26.56
Science research 0.23 8.05
Social science research 1.05 6.11
Society beneﬁt 0.27 10.39
Religious 0.41 14.24
11. Unfortunately, collecting appropriate information on board oversight is not feasible at
this time. We obtained measures of media presence, by state, such as newspaper circulation
per capita, and number of newspapers, by city. We do not believe that these are reliable indi-
cators of the quality of media presence, and leave each of these areas as possible avenues for
further research.230 Raymond Fisman and R. Glenn Hubbard
Table 7.7 Median Endowment and Donation Intensities, According to Oversight by
State Attorney General
Level of Oversight Endowment Intensity Donation Intensity Observations
0 1.05 0.01 125
1 1.17 0.03 349
2 1.03 0.02 1,029
3 1.41 0.08 635
4 1.67 0.06 193
5 1.00 0.01 150
6 1.23 0.05 1,478
7 1.00 0.05 493
8 1.05 0.01 125
Notes:Oversight is deﬁned by the number of powers accorded to the state attorney general in
overseeing nonproﬁts; see appendix A for further details. Endowment Intensity is the 1987 ra-
tio of endowment to total expenses. Donation Intensity is the 1987 ratio of donation revenue
to total revenue.
variable); and the result of the endogenous development of state oversight
(i.e., enforcement is strongest where self-dealing by nonproﬁts is most
likely). The ﬁrst of these factors does not seem to explain this nonresult;
oversight is still insigniﬁcant in a regression that controls for industry
aﬀects. Better data on other modes of governance are necessary to diﬀer-
entiate among the various other competing explanations.
In table 7.7, we also examine a related margin—donation intensity, de-
ﬁned as the ratio of an organization’s donations to total revenues. The sum-
mary statistics again do not show a clear pattern. However, in table 7.8, in
which we control for industry eﬀects, a systematic relationship emerges.
While the simple binary regression does not suggest a signiﬁcant relation-
ship between state-level oversight and donation intensity, after we add basic
controls, the estimated coeﬃcient on Oversight is statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 5 percent level, allowing for state-level clustering
of standard errors. Thus, in states with higher oversight, we observe more
donation-intensive organizations. This is at least suggestive that better over-
sight by the state encourages donors to provide resources to nonproﬁts.
Unfortunately, data availability constrains our ability to estimate the re-
lationship between governance and the endowment. We are now collecting
the data described in section 7.2, but we intend to examine the endowment-
governance link more closely in future research.
7.6 Conclusion
Nonproﬁt organizations constitute an extremely important part of the
U.S. economy. It is therefore surprising how little attention economists
have paid to the behavior of such organizations. In this paper, we examine
some fundamental issues of governance in nonproﬁts that stem directlyThe Role of Nonproﬁt Endowments 231
Table 7.8 Determinants of Donation Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oversight 0.0037 0.0047 0.0053 0.0036
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0016)
Log(per capita income) –0.027 –0.084
(0.039) (0.024)
Log(revenues) –0.040 –0.040 –0.024
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0026)
CONSTANT 0.12 0.77 1.03
(0.015) (0.041) (0.39)
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects? No No No Yes
R2 0.002 0.11 0.011 0.30
N 4,456
Notes:Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions use robust standard errors, allowing for
state-level clustering. Oversight is deﬁned by the number of powers accorded to the state at-
torney general in overseeing nonproﬁts, and takes on values from 0 to 8. See appendix A for
further details. Log(per capita income) in state per capita income in 1987. Log(revenues) is
the log of total revenues in 1987. The dependent variable in all cases is Donation Intensity, the
1987 ratio of donation revenue to total revenue.
from the nondistribution constraint that deﬁnes the nonproﬁt form. A pre-
cautionary-savings model of the endowment is supported by the data. We
further examine the possibility that endowments may be the source of po-
tential governance problems in nonproﬁt organizations. In particular, we
draw parallels between the functioning of for-proﬁt and nonproﬁt organi-
zations, and on this basis, lay out a framework for examining governance
concerns raised by nonproﬁt endowments. We discuss steps that govern-
ments and donors may take to mitigate these concerns, and discuss poten-
tial data sources for work in this area.
Appendix A
Powers of the State Attorneys General in Nonproﬁt Oversight
Thanks to the United States’ common-law heritage, most regulation of
nonproﬁts devolved to the states, which exhibit a very large amount of
variation in their extent of oversight. Almost uniformly, the power to mon-
itor and prosecute nonproﬁts has been allocated to the state attorneys gen-
eral. The Oﬃce of the Ohio Attorney General has documented the basic
legislative enactments that allow the state attorneys general to oversee non-
proﬁt organizations, and how these basic enactments vary across states.
The eight statutes covered by the report are listed below; for further details,
see Oﬃce of Ohio Attorney General (1977).1. Is the attorney general the enforcing authority?
2. It is the attorney general a necessary party for enforcement?
3. Does the attorney general have the power to institute suits to enforce
the charitable trust?
4. Is registration with the attorney general required?
5. Are periodic reports to the attorney general required?
6. Does the enforcing authority have subpoena power?
7. Does the enforcing agency have rulemaking authority?
8. Are probate judges required to notify the enforcing authority when-
ever a will containing a charitable bequest is admitted?
Appendix B
State-Level Oversight by Attorneys General
Alabama. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
Alaska. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
Arizona. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
Arkansas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Colorado . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Connecticut . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Delaware. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Florida . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Georgia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Hawaii. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Idaho. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Illinois. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Indiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Iowa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Kansas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Kentucky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
Maine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Massachusetts . . . . . . . . . . 7
Michigan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Minnesota . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Missouri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
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Montana. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Nevada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
New Hampshire. . . . . . . . . 2
New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
New Mexico. . . . . . . . . . . . 2
New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
North Carolina . . . . . . . . . 3
North Dakota . . . . . . . . . . 2
Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Oklahoma. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Pennsylvania . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . 8
South Carolina. . . . . . . . . . 5
South Dakota. . . . . . . . . . . 3
Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Texas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Virginia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
West Virginia . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Wisconsin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Wyoming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Source: Oﬃce of Ohio Attorney General (1977).References
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